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Abstract 
 
Air transport provides essential services in modern economies, though it produces significant negative external 
effects on the environment. Air quality, greenhouse gas emissions and noise are the main issues. The current 
environmental regulatory practice in air transport usually devises policy interventions for each externality in 
isolation disregarding their impact on the schedule delay, which in turn affects the consumers’ generalized price and 
social welfare. In this paper we develop a theoretical model that shows that such an approach is inadequate, and it 
may lead to the choice of wrong environmental policies. 
 
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Air transport services are essential in modern economies allowing mobility of passengers and freight throughout 
the territory. It is an important economic activity which contributed 135 billion Euros to the EU GDP in 2008 and 
employs more than 3 million workers (European Commission, 2009). Though the benefits of air transport are clear, 
the presence of negative externalities is also a well known fact. 
 
Air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, and noise are the main issues. Regarding air quality, the main concern 
refers to the possible impact on human health from emissions such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic 
compounds and particulates. On the other hand, the aviation impact on climate change stems from CO2, NOx and 
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Verhoef (2002) presents a general solution for the problem of second-best congestion tolling in static transportation 
networks where not all links can be tolled. Both papers relate to the present work in that they consider other effects 
in the transport system when a particular externality policy is implemented. However, none of these papers consider 
the effect on the schedule delay. 
 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of taking into account changes in the schedule delay as 
driven by environmental policy intervention in air transport markets when deciding on the optimality of such 
policies. We show that ignoring such interactions may lead to the choice of wrong policies, reducing the social 
welfare of the overall economy. There are several papers in the literature looking for the optimal ranking of policies 
to tackle environmental damage in a general context (see Kolstad, 1999, for a general view) and, specifically, in the 
transport sector (see, for example, Calthrop and Proost, 2003; Fullerton and West, 2000; and Proost and Van 
Dender, 2001). However, in this paper we show that the optimal ranking of policies may strongly depend on 
whether regulators act or do not act in a myopic way, that is, on whether or not they ignore the consequences of each 
environmental policy upon the schedule delay. 
 
Our approach is theoretical. We develop a model in which a route operated by a single air carrier is examined. 
This assumption is realistic since in many airports some routes are operated just by one carrier. Moreover, as 
Brueckner (2002a) points out, “though no carrier at any major airport controls 100 percent of the traffic, the 
monopoly case approximates the situation at many dominated hubs”. We assume that each operation produces 
environmental damage that may be reduced through an abatement effort exerted by the carrier. The abatement effort 
is not costless, so it will not be implemented without public intervention. We focus on three possible public 
instruments to increase the carriers’ abatement effort: an emission tax, an emission subsidy and a technological 
standard. Even though all these regulatory policies may be equivalent in achieving the socially optimal level of noise 
or air pollution, they have different effects on the frequency of service to be offered. We assume that the transport 
infrastructure is not congested, 5  so as the frequency increases, the possibility of experiencing a reduction in 
passengers’ travel time due to the schedule delay effect is always present.6   
 
Finally, as is common in the literature, we assume that public funds are obtained through distortionary taxation. 
We also assume that emission taxes generate revenues that can be used to finance cuts in existing taxes. Indeed, 
some economists and politicians have argued that there might be a “double dividend” associated with the 
introduction of an emission tax, since an emission tax not only discourages environmentally damaging activities, but 
also reduces the distortion cost of the tax system (see, for example, Goulder, 1995; Goulder et al., 1997; Pearce, 
1991; Poterba, 1993; or Repetto et al., 1992). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. In section 3, we analyze as 
a benchmark situation the case in which there is no public intervention at all. For this case, we compare the private 
solution with the social optimum. In section 4, we discuss the optimal environmental policy and the importance of 
taking into account its impact on the schedule delay. Finally, in section 5 we conclude. 
                                                          
5 In congested airports increases in frequency produce two opposite effects on passengers’ total travel time. On the one hand, as 
the frequency rises, the schedule delay decreases. On the other hand, as the frequency increases, the congestion cost rises (see 
Martin and Socorro, 2009, for a further discussion). If the total number of flights is below a critical value, the positive effects on 
the schedule delay dominate the increase in the congestion cost. All the results in this paper can also be applied to congested 
airports in which the schedule delay effect dominates (see also footnote 8). 
 
6 There are some other papers dealing with the trade-off between using a facility at a convenient time when the congestion is 
relatively high, or at a time when the facility is less congested but which is less convenient, implying higher schedule delay costs 
(see, for example, Kraus and Yoshida, 2002).  
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2. The model 
 
We consider a route in which there is a single transport service provider with constant marginal cost per 
operation denoted by 0c .
7 Let us denote by Q the total number of operations, which is equivalent to the total number 
of passengers under the following assumption. The number of passengers is equal to the product of operations, 
aircraft size (passenger capacity) and the load factor. We assume that the product of the aircraft size and the load 
factor is constant. Such an assumption is commonly used in the literature (see, for example, Basso, 2008; Brueckner, 
2002b; Pels and Verhoef, 2004; or Zhang and Zhang, 2006). When this holds, each operation has an equal number 
of passengers and the total number of operations is proportional to the total number of passengers. Thus, it is 
equivalent to consider the number of operations or the number of passengers. For the sake of simplicity, we consider 
just the total number of operations, that is, the frequency offered by the carrier. 
 
The generalized demand function relates Q to the consumers’ generalized price. Let us denote by ( )G Q  the 
consumers’ generalized price. The inverse generalized demand function is assumed to be downward sloping, 
'( ) 0,G Q   and satisfies that ''( ) 2 '( ) 0G Q Q G Q   for every Q . This condition is clearly fulfilled if ( )G Q  is either 
linear or convex, that is, ''( ) 0.G Q d  
 
The consumers’ generalized price is the sum of the ticket price P  and the value of the time spent in making the 
trip ( )vT Q , that is: 
 ( ) ( ),G Q P vT Q   (1) 
where v  is a positive parameter denoting the passengers’ value of time (on average), and ( )T Q  is the total time that 
a passenger spends in making the trip (including the access and egress time, the travel time and the schedule delay). 
We assume that the total amount of time required to make the trip decreases as the frequency increases, that is, 
'( ) 0.T Q   The higher the frequency, the lower the schedule delay, and thus the lower the consumers’ generalized 
price.8  
 
From expression (1) we can deduce the carrier’s perceived inverse demand function, which relates the quantity 
demanded (the total number of operations) and the ticket price:  
 ( ) ( ).P G Q vT Q   (2) 
 
With the carrier’s perceived inverse demand function, the carrier takes into account that passengers’ demand 
function depends on the generalized price and, thus, the higher the total time that passengers spend in making the 
trip, the lower the ticket price that they are willing to pay.  
 
When operating, the air transport service provider produces pollutant emissions, such as noise and air pollution. 
We assume that each operation causes a constant environmental damage denoted by (0,1).d  However, the 
operator may reduce his emitted noise and air pollution through an abatement effort. The effort can take different 
forms, such as the use of cleaner technology or cleaner fuels, operating at lower speed, etc. Let us denote by 
                                                          
7 The literature on costs functions for transportation is quite extensive. In particular, Oum and Waters (1997), find many 
examples of constant returns to scale for the air transport industry in the case of airlines (7 out of 10 studies). This marginal cost 
is usually stated in terms of revenue passenger kilometres. In our theoretical model and according to our assumptions it is the 
marginal cost per operation.   
 
8 Recall that we assume that the airport is not congested. In a congested airport, the higher the frequency, the lower the schedule 
delay but the higher the congestion cost. Thus, if the frequency increases, the consumers’ generalized price may decrease (if the 
schedule delay effect dominates) or it may increase (if the congestion cost effect dominates). 
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[0,1]e  the firm’s abatement effort per operation, which is supplied at a constant marginal cost ec  per operation. 
We assume that both the cost and the marginal cost of the effort is zero if no effort is exerted, that is, ( 0) 0ec e    
and ' ( 0) 0.ec e    We also assume that the marginal cost of the effort is one if the maximum effort is exerted, that 
is, ' ( 1) 1.ec e    Finally, the marginal cost of effort is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of .e  By 
construction, (1 ) [0,1]e   denotes the firm’s final level of emissions per operation. We assume that if the transport 
service provider exerts an abatement effort e , then the environmental damage reduces to (1 )d e . 
 
From the previous assumptions, we can deduce that the total cost ( )C Q  for the transport operator is a linear 
function of the total number of operations. Formally: 
 ( ) ( ) ,T o eC Q c Q c c Q    (3) 
where Tc  denotes the total marginal cost for the air transport service provider, obtained as the sum of the marginal 
operating cost and the cost of effort (both constant per operation). 
3. Benchmark case: no environmental regulation 
Let us compare the carrier’s profit-maximizing choice of abatement effort and frequency with the socially 
optimal solutions. 
3.1. The carrier’s optimum 
The carrier chooses the level of frequency and abatement effort in order to maximize its own profit. The carrier’s 
profit ( , )Q eS  is the difference between total revenues and total costs. The carrier’s total revenue function is derived 
from the carrier’s perceived inverse demand function, that is, the function relating the quantity demanded and the 
ticket price. Formally: 
 
,
 [ ( ) - ( )]  -  .TQ eMax G Q vT Q Q c Q  (4)  
If the government does not intervene at all, the carrier chooses the level of abatement effort that minimizes his 
total costs. Clearly, the operator’s total costs are minimized by setting 0,NIe   where the superscript NI  denotes 
the case in which there is no public intervention. 
 
To determine the profit-maximizing service frequency, the carrier solves the maximization programme given by 
expression (4). Thus, the choice of frequency is obtained by setting the first derivative of profits, ( , ),Q eS  with 
respect to Q  equal to zero. Using subscripts to denote profits partial derivatives, the first order condition of such a 
maximization program can be written as: 
 ( , ) '( ) - '( ) ( ) - ( ) - 0,NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NIQ TQ e G Q Q vT Q Q G Q vT Q cS     (5) 
which implies that in the optimum the carrier’s marginal revenue function, 
'( ) - '( ) ( ) - ( ),NI NI NI NI NI NIMR G Q Q vT Q Q G Q vT Q   is  equal to the marginal private cost, .Tc  
 
The second order condition of the operator’s maximization problem is given by: 
 ( , ) ''( ) 2 '( ) [2 '( ) ''( )] 0,NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NIQQ Q e G Q Q G Q v T Q Q T QS       (6) 
which requires the carrier’s marginal revenue to cut the private marginal cost from above. Since the marginal private 
cost Tc  is constant, condition (6) just requires the carrier’s marginal revenue function to be downward sloping. We 
assume that such a condition is satisfied. Thus, expression (5) implicitly defines the optimal frequency to be offered 
by the transport service provider without public intervention. 
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3.2. The social optimum 
The consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the area below the generalized demand function and 
the generalized price paid by passengers. 
 
0
( , ) ( ) - ( ) .
Q
CS Q e G z dz G Q Q ³  (7) 
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and the carrier’s profits, minus the external cost of the 
noise or environmental pollution.9 If the regulator were able to control directly the choice of abatement effort and 
frequency, he would solve the following maximization program: 
 
0,
 ( , ) [ ( ) - ( ) ]  [ ( ) - ( ) - - ( )]  -  (1- ) .
Q
o eQ e
Max SW Q e G z dz G Q Q G Q vT Q c c e Q d e Q ³  (8) 
 
First order conditions lead to the following expressions: 
 ' ( ) .SOec e d  (9) 
 ( , ) '( ) - (1- ) 0,SO SO SO SO SOQ Q e G Q Q d eS    (10) 
where superscript SO  denotes the socially optimal solution. The investment in noise or air pollution abatement 
effort is optimal when the marginal cost of abatement per operation equals the marginal social benefit of abatement 
effort per operation, d . Hence, it is socially optimal to force the operator to exert a strictly positive effort in reducing 
noise and air pollution, though it is not socially optimal to force him to exert the maximum effort. The total number 
of operations is socially optimal when the marginal social benefit of operating equals the social marginal cost, 
(1 ).Tc d e   
 
Second order conditions are given by: 
 '' ( ) 0.SOec e   (11) 
 ( , ) [ ''( ) '( )] 0.SO SO SO SO SOQQ Q e G Q Q G QS     (12) 
 
The marginal cost of effort is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of .e  Thus, expression (10) is 
satisfied. Expression (11) is assumed to be satisfied and requires the marginal social benefit of operating to cut the 
marginal social cost from above. Since the marginal social cost, (1 ),Tc d e   is constant, condition (12) just 
requires the marginal social benefit to be downward sloping. 
Let us define the (positive) demand elasticity with respect to the generalized price as .
'
dQ G G
dG Q G Q
H {     If 
the demand elasticity evaluated in the socially optimal frequency ( )SOQH  is low (high) enough, for every possible 
abatement effort, the optimal frequency from the social point of view will be higher (lower) than the frequency 
offered by the carrier. Thus, if ( )SOQH  is low (high) enough, it is socially optimal to increase (decrease) the 
frequency, since the social loss in terms of consumer surplus would be higher (lower) than the total environmental 
damage. All these results are summarized in the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: The socially optimal level of abatement effort per operation is higher than the effort exerted by the 
carrier without public intervention. Moreover, if ( )SOQH  is low (high) enough, for every abatement effort, the 
socially optimal frequency is higher (lower) than the frequency offered by the operator. 
 
                                                          
9 Notice that consumers pay a generalized price ( ) ( ).G Q P vT Q   However, the carrier only charges the ticket price .P  The 
total value of time ( )vT Q Q  is a cost for the consumers but it is not a revenue for the carrier, so the social benefit is the area 
under the generalized demand curve up to Q  minus ( ) .vT Q Q   
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Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. The first step consists of proving that 0.SOe !  We know that the marginal 
cost of effort is an increasing function of ,e  and ' ( 0) 0.ec e    Moreover, we know that (0,1).d  Thus, from 
condition (9) we can conclude that 0,SOe !  as we wanted to prove. The second step consists of proving that if 
( )SOQH is sufficiently low, for every ,e  .SOQ Q!  Consider the following generalized maximization problem:  
 
0,
 [ ( ) - ( ) ]  [ ( ) - ( ) - - ( )]  -  (1- ) ,
Q
o eQ e
Max G z dz G Q Q G Q vT Q c c e Q d e QT T³  
which reduces to the social welfare optimization problem when 1,T   and the profit-maximization problem when 
0.T   First order conditions with respect to e  and Q  for this generalized maximization problem are, respectively, 
given by: 
 ' ( ) 0.ec e Q dQT    
 [ '( ) (1- )] [ '( ) '( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.o eG Q Q d e G Q vT Q Q G Q vT Q c c eT          
 
Let us now investigate the sign of / .dQ dT  Applying the implicit function theorem we have that: 
1'' 0
,
'( ) (1 )0 [ ''( ) '( )] [ ''( ) ''( )] 2 '( ) 2 ''( )
e
de
c dQd
dQ G Q Q d eG Q Q G Q G Q vT Q Q G Q vT Q
d
T
T
T
ª º« »  ª º ª º « » « » « »      « » ¬ ¼¬ ¼« »¬ ¼
 
where the second term is the inverse of the Hessian matrix. Then: 
'( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) .
[ ''( ) '( )] [ ''( ) ''( )] 2 '( ) 2 ''( ) ( , ) [ ''( ) '( )] 0.QQ
dQ G Q Q d e G Q Q d e
d G Q Q G Q G Q vT Q Q G Q vT Q Q e G Q Q G QT T S T
               
 
The denominator is negative since second order conditions are satisfied, either for 0T   (the profit-maximization 
problem ) and 1T  (the social welfare optimization problem ). So if '( ) ( ) (1 ),G Q Q d e !    which holds when 
( )( ) ( ) ,
(1 )
G QQ
d e
H  !   that is, when ( )QH  is low (high) enough, /dQ dT is positive (negative), and thus the socially 
optimal frequency is higher (lower) than the frequency offered by the operator. This completes the proof. 
 
The operator sets his marginal revenue equal to his marginal private cost. The regulator sets the marginal social 
benefit equal to the marginal social cost. The marginal social benefit curve lies above the carrier’s marginal revenue 
curve, and the marginal social cost curve lies above the operator’s marginal private cost curve. If the demand is 
perfectly elastic, the marginal social benefit and the marginal revenue curves coincide, and so the socially optimal 
frequency is lower than the frequency offered by the operator. 
 
From this case we can obtain some interesting results. On the one hand, forcing the carrier provider to exert a 
strictly positive abatement effort may have a negative effect on the frequency to be offered. Such a negative impact 
on the frequency due to an increase in the firm’s abatement effort will be intensified (mitigated) if a schedule delay 
effect exists and the marginal social travel time is decreasing (increasing) in the frequency. The schedule delay 
exists when the consumers’ travel time decreases as the frequency increases, '( ) 0.T Q   On the contrary, there is no 
schedule delay when the consumer’s travel time is independent from the frequency, '( ) 0T Q  . The total social 
travel time is denoted by ( ),QT Q  and the marginal social travel time is given by ( ) '( ).T Q QT Q  If there is a 
schedule delay, the operator internalizes it in his perceived demand function and offers a higher frequency.10 
However, an increase in the carrier’s total marginal cost implies a reduction in the frequency. If the marginal social 
                                                          
10 In our model, the operator is a monopolist so he fully internalizes the schedule delay effect. In a Cournot oligopoly, the 
schedule delay effect is only partly internalized, since each carrier considers only the schedule delay effect of its own passengers.  
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travel time is decreasing (increasing) in the frequency, the monopoly will (not) be able to decrease the frequency 
without losing too much revenue. In such a case, the reduction of the frequency will be exacerbated (mitigated). 
These results are formally stated in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If the operator is forced to exert a strictly positive abatement effort, the profit-maximizing frequency 
offered would be reduced. However, such a reduction would be higher (lower) if there is a schedule delay and the 
marginal social travel time is decreasing (increasing) in .Q  
 
Proof: On the one hand, if the carrier were forced to exert a strictly positive effort, his total marginal cost Tc  would 
be increased. Applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition given by expression (5), it is 
straightforward to prove that as Tc  rises, the optimal frequency Q  decreases. Formally: 
 / 1/ 0,T QQdQ dc S   
where ''( ) 2 '( ) [2 '( ) ''( )],QQ G Q Q G Q v T Q QT QS      if there is a schedule delay, and ''( ) 2 '( ),QQ G Q Q G QS    
otherwise.  
 
The condition 2 '( ) ''( ) 0,T Q QT Q   just implies that the marginal social travel time is decreasing in .Q  Thus, if the 
marginal social travel time is decreasing (increasing) in Q , the reduction of the frequency due to an increase in 
firm’s abatement effort would be higher (lower) if there is a schedule delay. This completes the proof.  
 
The abatement effort is not costless so the transport operator will exert no effort without public intervention. 
Thus, in this context the government’s intervention is justified. 
 
From Proposition 1 we can deduce that a policy aimed at increasing the operator’s abatement effort may have a 
negative impact on the frequency to be offered. However, such a negative effect will be mitigated (exacerbated) if 
there is a schedule delay and the marginal social travel time is increasing (decreasing) in the frequency. The 
intuition of this result is as follows: if the total amount of time required to make the trip decreases with the 
frequency, the consumers’ generalized price will increase as the frequency decreases. So, the lower the frequency, 
the lower the ticket price that the carrier can charge to passengers. Therefore, when deciding the frequency to be 
offered, the carrier takes into account the negative effects that reductions in the frequency have on travel times. 
Besides, if the marginal social travel time is increasing (decreasing) in Q , passengers (and thus the carrier’s 
revenues) will be even more (less) sensitive to reductions in frequency. Thus, the carrier will optimally choose to 
mitigate (increase) the reduction in the frequency. 
 
The choice of the profit-maximizing frequency by the carrier and its effects in social terms are depicted in the 
four-quadrant diagram of Figure 1. The first quadrant displays the generalized inverse demand curve, relating the 
quantity demanded to the generalized price. The second quadrant relates the generalized price paid by passengers ,G  
and the ticket price charged by the carrier .P  The third quadrant displays the carrier’s perceived inverse demand 
curve relating P  to .Q  Finally, the fourth quadrant just displays the 45-degree line. The carrier’s choice of Q  is 
obtained in the third quadrant in the usual way, as the level of Q  that equates marginal revenue to private marginal 
cost. Then, having determined the level of ,Q  social surplus can be calculated in the first quadrant. Notice that the 
schedule delay causes the carrier’s perceived demand curve to become more elastic. However, when there is a 
schedule delay the slope of the carrier’s marginal revenue function is given by:  
 ''( ) 2 '( )  [2 '( ) ''( )].dMR G Q Q G Q v T Q QT Q
dQ
     (13) 
 
Thus, when there is a schedule delay and the marginal social travel time is decreasing (increasing) in ,Q  
2 '( ) ''( ) ( )0,T Q QT Q  !  the carrier’s marginal revenue function becomes flatter (steeper). That is why the 
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reduction in the frequency due to an increase in total marginal cost Tc  is higher (lower) when there is a schedule 
delay and the marginal social travel time is decreasing (increasing) in .Q  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Four-quadrant diagram: (1) Generalized inverse demand curve, (2) Generalized price, (3) Carrier’s 
perceived inverse demand curve, (4) The 45-degree line. 
 
45º
(1) CS    (2)
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CT                  P *
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The government can make use of several instruments to increase the carrier’s abatement effort, such as emission 
taxes, emission subsidies or technological standards. All these instruments induce different effects on the number of 
operations to be offered and the overall distortions of the economy. Moreover, as shown in Proposition 1, the effect 
of a certain environmental policy on the frequency to be offered will strongly depend on the existence of the 
schedule delay. No schedule delay means that passengers’ preferred departure time coincides with the real departure 
time. This happens either when the frequency is very high, and therefore the difference between the preferred and 
real departure time is negligible, or when all passengers have the same preferences about departure time and such 
preferences coincide with the real departure time. Certainly, these situations are not common in air transport and a 
schedule delay usually exists.  
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In the next section we show that when there is a schedule delay, the optimal ranking of policies may strongly 
depend on whether regulators act or do not act in a myopic way. The reason is that when there is a schedule delay, 
the operator internalizes such an effect in its perceived demand function. If the regulator does not take into account 
this positive externality, he will fail in predicting the effects of the different environmental policies and he may end 
up choosing the wrong one. 
 
4. Optimal environmental policy 
We assume that the regulator is committed to emit the social optimal level of noise or air pollution. Given this 
commitment, he has to look for the optimal environmental policy to implement the socially optimal level of 
abatement effort.11 The socially optimal level of noise or air pollution can be achieved either by an emission tax, an 
emission subsidy or a technological standard (that is, a command and control policy).12 Although these policies may 
be equivalent to achieving an optimal level of noise or air pollution, they have different effects on the frequency to 
be offered by the carrier, and thus on social welfare. Moreover, emission taxes generate revenues that can be used to 
finance cuts in existing distortionary taxes. Let us analyze the optimal environmental policy to be implemented in 
this context. 
 
In Section 3, we show that the socially optimal level of abatement effort SOe  satisfies that ' ( ) .SOec e d  In this 
section, we will analyze three alternative policies to implement such an abatement effort. The first one is an 
emission tax. Let t  be the emission tax that the operator must pay per operation, which is proportional to his 
emission rate. The operator chooses the level of abatement effort in order to minimize his total costs. Thus, when 
deciding his abatement effort, the carrier must balance the additional cost of exerting more effort against the 
reduction in tax payments. Formally, the operator chooses the level of effort that solves the following minimization 
problem: 
  (1- ) .eeMin t e c  (14) 
 
The first order condition requires that ' ( ) ,ETec e t  where the superscript ET  denotes the presence of an 
emission tax. Clearly, by setting t d , the government implements the socially optimal effort. In this case, the 
carrier’s total marginal cost is given by the sum of his marginal operating cost, the emission tax per operation that, 
given his emission rate, he must pay, and the marginal cost of effort: 
 (1 ) ( ). ET SO SOT o ec c d e c e     (15) 
 
The second policy that might be used by the regulator to implement the socially optimal level of abatement effort 
is an emission subsidy. Let s  be the emission subsidy per operation that the transport service provider obtains for 
each unit of abatement effort. In this case, when deciding the level of abatement effort to be exerted, the operator 
solves: 
  - .eeMin c se  (16) 
 
                                                          
11 This commitment may be due to an international agreement about the level of pollution and/or noise. 
 
12 Some examples of command and control policies are operational restrictions, regulatory provisions on the type of technology 
and fuels used, fulfilment of cleaner requirements and standards, etc.  
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The optimal solution implies that ' ( ) ,ESec e s  where the superscript ES  denotes the existence of an emission 
subsidy. By setting s d , the government implements the socially optimal effort, and the operator’s total marginal 
cost is given by: 
 ( ) . ES SO SOT o ec c c e de    (17) 
 
Finally, the third policy that may be used by the government to implement the socially optimal level of abatement 
effort is a command and control policy. Command and control regulations applied to transport typically imply the 
introduction of some requirements or standards on the vehicles and the technology to be used. Suppose that the 
regulator issues detailed requirements for the operator in order to force him to exert an effort .SOe  Using the 
superscript TS  to denote the presence of a technological standard, the carrier’s total marginal cost is given by the 
following expression: 
 ( ). TS soT o ec c c e   (18) 
 
Although the socially optimal level of abatement effort can be achieved either with an emission tax, an emission 
subsidy or a technological standard, all these policies have different effects on the carrier’s total marginal cost, and 
thus, on the frequency to be offered. Indeed, comparing expressions (15), (17) and (18), it is straightforward to see 
that ES TS ETT T Tc c c   and, thus, .ES TS ETQ Q Q! !  These results are summarized in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: The socially optimal level of abatement effort can be implemented either with an emission tax, an 
emission subsidy or a technological standard. However, all these policies have different effects on the frequency 
offered by the carrier. In particular, an emission subsidy induces the highest frequency while an emission tax, the 
lowest. 
 
Proof: The optimal frequency offered by the operator is given by setting ( , ) 0.SOQ Q eS   The optimal frequency Q  
is implicitly defined by such a first derivative and, applying the implicit function theorem, we have that 
/ 1/ 0. T QQdQ dc S  Since ,ES TS ETT T Tc c c   then ,ES TS ETQ Q Q! !  as we wanted to prove.  
 
With an emission subsidy the regulator manages to implement the socially optimal level of abatement effort and 
the highest frequency. But any subsidy requires the use of public funds that are obtained through distortionary 
taxation. Let O  denote the cost of public funds. 
 
The social welfare if an emission subsidy is used to implement the socially optimal level of abatement effort SOe  
is given by the following formula: 
0
( , )  [ ( ) ( ) ]  [ ( ) - ( ) - ( ) ]  
               -  (1- )  -  (1 ) .
ESQES SO ES ES ES ES SO SO ES
o e
SO ES SO ES
SW Q e G z dz G Q Q G Q vT Q c c e de Q
d e Q de QO
    

³
 (19) 
 
The socially optimal level of abatement effort may be also implemented through an emission tax, though this 
policy induces the lowest frequency. If we assume that the revenues that are obtained through such a tax are used to 
reduce the overall distortions of the economy, the social welfare is obtained by: 
0
( , )   [ ( ) ( ) ]  [ ( ) - ( ) - (1 ) ( )]  
               -  (1- )  + (1 ) (1 ) .
ETQET SO ET ET ET ET SO SO ET
o e
SO ET SO ET
SW Q e G z dz G Q Q G Q vT Q c d e c e Q
d e Q d e QO
     
 
³
                 (20) 
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Command and control policies can be implemented without affecting the government’s revenues since they only 
imply the fulfilment of certain requirements. Thus, if a technological standard is used to implement the socially 
optimal level of abatement effort, the social welfare is given by the following expression: 
0
( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ]  [ ( ) - ( ) - ( )]  
               -  (1- )  . 
TSQTS SO TS TS TS TS SO TS
o e
SO TS
SW Q e G z dz G Q Q G Q vT Q c c e Q
d e Q
   ³          (21) 
 
From Lemma 1 we know that if the demand elasticity evaluated in the socially optimal frequency ( )SOQH  is low 
enough, for every possible abatement effort, the frequency offered by the operator is lower than the optimal 
frequency from a social point of view. Thus, if ( )SOQH  is low enough, when deciding the optimal environmental 
policy to implement the socially optimal level of abatement effort, the regulator faces a trade-off. On the one hand, 
the highest (lowest) frequency is obtained with an emission subsidy (tax). On the other hand, the use of subsidies 
increases (decreases) the overall distortion of the economy. 
 
In this section we show that when there is a schedule delay, the optimal ranking of policies may strongly depend 
on whether regulators act or do not act in a myopic way. Regulators act in a myopic way when they do not take into 
account the effects that a particular policy has on other air transport externalities such as the schedule delay. The 
carrier internalizes the schedule delay in its perceived demand function, so if the regulator does not take into account 
such a positive externality, he will fail in predicting the real effects of the different environmental policies.  
 
For example, suppose that there is a schedule delay but the regulator does not take it into account, and he chooses 
an emission tax rather than an emission subsidy. If the regulator chooses such a policy it is because the negative 
impact of taxes on the frequency is lower than the positive impact of taxes in terms of the overall distortions on the 
economy. However, we know that the effect of the environmental policies on the frequency is higher if there is a 
schedule delay and the marginal social travel time is decreasing in .Q  So, in this case if the regulator had considered 
the effects of the environmental policy on the schedule delay, the optimal ranking of policies might have been 
different. A similar result may be obtained when there is a schedule delay and the marginal social travel time is 
increasing in .Q  This is stated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: If there is a schedule delay, the optimal ranking of policies may depend on whether regulators act or 
do not act in a myopic way, that is, on whether they take into account the effects that each environmental policy has 
on environmental externalities only or on all air transport externalities. 
 
Proof: To demonstrate that this possibility may indeed arise, let us consider the following counter example:  
Suppose a linear inverse generalized demand function, that is, ( ) ,G Q QD E   and quadratic costs for effort, 
2 / 2.ec e  This latter assumption implies that the marginal cost of abatement is rising, that is, more sophisticated 
and costly techniques are required to further decrease pollutant emissions.13 
 
Assume that the total amount of time required to make the trip is given by ( ) ( / ),T Q a f Q   where a  denotes 
the minimum time (in hours) required to make the trip. This minimum time does not depend on the frequency and 
includes both, the access and egress time, and the travel time. As Q  increases, the total amount of time ( )T Q  tends 
to the minimum .a  This is the so-called schedule delay. Notice that in this case 2 '( ) ''( ) 0T Q QT Q  , that is, the 
                                                          
13 The assumption of quadratic costs for abatement effort is usually applied in the environmental economics literature. Some 
examples are Calthrop and Proost (2003), Chavez and Stanlund (2003), Hoel and Karp (2001), Nannerup (1998), and Yates and 
Cronshaw (2001).  
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marginal social travel time is decreasing in .Q 14 The square root specification has been obtained from structural 
models (see Mohring ,1972) and it has been extensively used in empirical papers (see, for example, Borenstein and 
Netz, 1999, or Richard, 2003).  
 
The carrier internalizes the schedule delay in its perceived demand function and he chooses the optimal frequency. 
However, we assume that the regulator acts in a myopic way, that is, he considers just one kind of externality at the 
time. In particular, he considers the environmental externalities (noise and air pollution) but he ignores the existence 
of the schedule delay. In other words, the regulator considers that the total amount of time required to make the trip 
is given by: ,T a b   where b  denotes the distance between the real total time and the minimum. Such a distance 
is strictly positive and does not depend on the frequency.  
 
In order to search for the optimal environmental policy, the regulator tries to anticipate the effects of different 
environmental policies on the abatement effort and frequency offered by the carrier. However, when the regulator 
ignores the schedule delay, he fails in predicting the real effects of the different environmental policies. 
 
Suppose the following values for the parameters: 158,  1,  13.62,  10,  1.17,  5,  0.5,  2ov a b c d fD E         
and 0.4.O  15 In other words, we are assuming a linear and unitary slope inverse generalized demand function for a 
long-distance trip (minimum 10 hours). The value of time is 13.62 Euros per hour, which is consistent with the 
European average value of time for air transport estimated in the HEATCO Project (see Bickel et al., 2006).16 The 
value for the distortion cost is also consistent with the empirical evidence, ranging from 0.15 to 0.5,17 and the value 
for the environmental damage is assumed to be intermediate. 
 
The following table compares the social welfare and the frequency predicted by the regulator if an emission subsidy, 
a technological standard or an emission tax is used to implement the socially optimal level of abatement effort, 
0.5,SOe   in both cases, when the regulator acts in a myopic way and when he considers all the externalities. It also 
includes the frequency and the social welfare obtained if there is no public intervention and the operator exerts no 
effort at all. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of environmental policies for the cases in which either the regulator acts in a myopic 
and non myopic way, and ( ) /T Q a f Q   
 
 The myopic solution The non myopic solution 
e Q SW ' SW e Q SW ' SW 
Emission subsidy 0.5 0.4948 0.0703 9.67% 0.5 5.5795 11.176 5.27% 
Technological standard 0.5 0.3698 0.1126 75.66% 0.5 5.4095 10.864 2.33% 
                                                          
14 A similar result can be obtained for the case in which the marginal social travel time is increasing in the frequency. An 
example of a function satisfying that 2 '( ) ''( ) 0T Q QT Q !  is 2( ) / .T Q a f Q   
 
15 This is just a counter example to prove Proposition 2. Obviously, different values of parameters may lead to different results.  
 
16 The estimated values are for long-distance non-work passenger trips. Higher values of time correspond to richer countries. 
Thus, for air transport the lowest value of 7.12 corresponds to trips in Lithuania and the highest value of 19.13 corresponds to 
trips in Luxembourg. 
 
17 There are several papers in the literature estimating the cost of public funds. For instance, Ballard et al. (1985) find that the 
welfare loss due to 1% increase in all distortionary tax rates is between 17% and 56% per dollar. More generally, it seems that the 
shadow cost of public funds lies in the range of 15% to 50% in countries with a developed efficient tax-collection system 
(Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002). 
674  M. Pilar Socorro and Ofelia Betancor / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 662–677
 
Emission tax 0.5 0.2448 0.1143 78.31% 0.5 5.2366 10.489 -1.19% 
No intervention 0 0.4323 0.0641 - 0 5.4948 10.616 - 
 
The increase in social welfare due to the introduction of a certain environmental policy varies depending on whether 
the regulator acts or does not act in a myopic way. In particular, if the regulator does not take into account the 
schedule delay, he would fail in predicting the frequency to be offered by the air carrier. Taking into account these 
wrong predictions, the regulator would choose first an emission tax, second a technological standard, and third an 
emission subsidy. However, if the regulator considers the impact on the schedule delay, the optimal ranking of 
environmental policies would be completely different. In this case, he would correctly predict the frequency to be 
offered by the carrier and he would choose first an emission subsidy, and second a technological standard. An 
emission tax should never be chosen since the social welfare when such a policy is used is lower than when there is 
no public intervention. This example shows how a myopic regulator may end up by choosing a totally wrong policy, 
an emission tax, which is the worst option, even worse than the no public intervention alternative.  
 
The higher the schedule delay, the larger the differences between what the regulator predicts and what really 
happens and, hence, the higher the losses in terms of social welfare. Moreover, if we compare the frequency and 
level of social welfare for the cases in which the schedule delay is and is not considered, we can observe that both 
are higher in the former case. 
 
This completes the proof.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Environmental interventions in air transport markets are usually devised in isolation and disregard the impact on 
the schedule delay, which in turn is linked with passengers’ surplus and social welfare. Such an approach is 
inadequate, with important consequences on the optimality of environmental policies. 
 
We arrive at this result through the development of a theoretical model that illustrates this point for the case of a 
monopoly provider. In particular, we show that if there is a schedule delay, the impact of environmental policies on 
the frequency to be offered might be either exacerbated or mitigated.  
 
All the results obtained in this paper can be extended to other transport modes in which the route is operated by a 
monopolist. For air, maritime and rail transport, when a passenger decides to make a trip, he knows in advance all 
the relevant details, such as scheduled times of departure and arrival and thus, increases in frequency reduce the 
schedule delay. For other transport modes, such as the bus industry, in which vehicles arrive randomly at stops, 
increases in frequency reduce the time that passengers have to wait at the bus-stop. In this latter case, the positive 
externality is the so-called Mohring effect (Mohring, 1972). Either the impact on the schedule delay or the Mohring 
effect should be taken into account by environmental regulators when searching for optimal environmental policies 
in transport markets. 
 
General results in the environmental economics literature cannot be directly applied to the transport sector since 
there are specific effects in transport, such as the impact on the schedule delay (or the Mohring effect) and the level 
of congestion, that are not present in other sectors or industries in the economy. Disregarding the importance of such 
specific effects in the air transport sector may lead to the choice of wrong environmental policies, reducing the 
social welfare of the overall economy. 
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